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"HATE SPEECH" ON THE COLLEGE CAMPUS: FREEDOM OF
SPEECH AND EQUALITY AT THE CROSSROADS*
William A. Kaplin**
In recent years, the phenomenon of "hate speech"-or more
broadly, "hate behavior"-has created a wrenching problem for Amer-
ican college campuses.
The term hate speech, as commonly understood, refers to verbal
and written words, and to symbolic acts, that convey a grossly nega-
tive assessment of particular persons or groups based on their race,
gender, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, or disability. Hate
speech thus is highly derogatory and degrading, and the language is
typically coarse. The purpose of the speech is more to humiliate or
wound than it is to communicate ideas or information. Common vehi-
cles for such speech include epithets, slurs, insults, taunts, and
threats.
I will concentrate particularly on the First Amendment implica-
tions of the hate speech problem, comparing the free speech values
that may be endangered by attempts to regulate hate speech with the
equality values that may be endangered if hate speech is left un-
checked. I will also concentrate on processes that universities may de-
vise to resolve these crucial value questions. My goal is to add order
* The fifth annual Winston Howard Distinguished Lecture, University of Wyo-
ming College of Law, April 12, 1991. For publication purposes, the author has ex-
panded, updated, and re-edited the text and footnotes of the paper delivered on this
occasion. Some portions of this lecture were adapted by the author from an article to
be published as part of a symposium in Journal of Higher Education; see infra note
16. These adapted excerpts appear here with the permission of Journal of Higher
Education.
**. Professor of Law, Catholic University of America; Visiting Professor of Law,
Wake Forest University, 1990-1991; Distinguished Visiting Scholar, Institute for
Higher Education Law and Governance, University of Houston Law Center, Fall 1991.
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and balance to the differing points of view concerning hate speech,
and to bring a measure of practicality and concreteness to what has
often been a rather theoretical and abstract debate. In short, my focus
will be on this specific question: What may, and what should, univer-
sity communities do about the hate speech problem, and how should
they go about doing it?
ILLUSTRATIONS OF HATE BEHAVIOR
Let me begin with a series of illustrations of hate behavior. Each
illustration portrays a real-life incident that recently occurred on
some major university campus in this country.1 As I describe these
incidents, I am mindful of the dilemma posed by Professor Kent
Greenawalt: "how much to risk offending by speaking the upsetting
words and phrases; how much to risk failure to come to terms with the
real issues by avoiding the words that shock."' 2 To strike a balance, I
have avoided some of the most profane and shocking language while
nevertheless selecting a range of representative examples.
Consider then, the particular incidents that follow. Consider how
they implicate free speech and equality values. Consider what univer-
sities should do to respond to such incidents or prevent their reoccur-
rence. Equally important, imagine that you are an observer at the
scene of these incidents, or that you are actually the victim. What is
your reaction, emotionally as well as intellectually?
1) During halftime at a football game between major football
powers, the host school introduces a black woman as the new home-
coming queen. When her name is announced, loud boos ring out from
spectators in the stands, and a large Confederate flag is unfurled.
2) At the Jewish student union on campus, unknown persons
spray paint the walls of the union with swastikas and with the phrase
"Hitler is God."
3) Campus sidewalks are defaced with various slogans painted on
them. Prominent among the slogans are "Step here, kill a queer" and
"Stay in the closet fag."
4) A Chinese graduate student returns to his library carrel and
notices graffiti scribbled there in his absence. The message reads "Die
Chink, hostile Americans want your yellow hide."
5) Students blow up condoms with helium and make a balloon
1. These incidents, and many others, have been reported in the popular or profes-
sional press and have been mentioned in the law review literature on "hate speech".
No attempt is made here to cite the various primary and secondary sources that have
described real life hate speech incidents occurring on American campuses. See gener-
ally HOWARD ERLICH, CAMPUs ETHNO-VIOLENCE AND THE POLICY OPTIONs 41-72 (1990).
2. Kent Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets: Are They Protected Speech?, 42
RUTGERs L. REV. 287, 291 (1990).
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bouquet. They then pin this bouquet of condoms to the dormitory
room door of a female student, along with a sign that says "Jewish
slut."
6) Five white students dressed in Ku Klux Klan garb crash
through the door of a black student's dorm room. They set up and
burn a paper cross, harass the black student, and then flee.
7) Two black women students returning to their dormitory room
discover that the insignia KKK has been carved into the door of their
room.
8) Members of a campus fraternity hold a fund raiser which they
call a slave auction. Fraternity pledges show up in blackfaces and Afro
wigs, and perform parodies of prominent black entertainers.
9) A white fraternity votes to accept a black member. One night
shortly thereafter, fraternity members discover a cross burning on the
front lawn of their fraternity house.
10) When returning at night from a drinking party with fraternity
brothers, a student passes by a dormitory and loudly shouts obscen-
ities and racist comments that prominently include the word "nigger."
When a dorm resident asks him to quiet down, the student shouts
back: "What are you a faggot?" "What are you a Jew?"
11) Several white students trail a black woman student across
campus at night. They taunt her and make sexually suggestive com-
ments, prominently including the comment "I've never tried a nigger
before."
12) A group of Japanese students is accosted on campus and
taunted. The taunters also throw eggs at the Japanese students and
urinate in front of them.
13) Several hate mailings are sent to a Native-American student
who is serving as student council president. One of the mailings in-
cludes this message: "You are a redskinned bitch and Custer should
have finished off your entire degenerate race."
14) In a Hebrew house which keeps a kosher kitchen, Jewish stu-
dents discover that the kitchen has been strewn with litter and
smeared with human excrement; they also discover anti-Semitic slurs
and a note which reads, in part, "Didn't Hitler teach you nothing?"
15) Several white students argue heatedly with a black student
over whether the composer Beethoven had any black ancestors. Later
that night, the white students mark up a Beethoven poster to turn his
likeness into a cartoon caricature of a black face. They then place the
poster outside the black student's room in a campus dormitory that
emphasizes the theme of black culture.
These are not isolated examples. Various commentators have
noted the expanding scope of the current wave of campus hate behav-
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ior. In terms of racial incidents alone, the National Institute Against
Prejudice and Violence estimates that at least 300 campuses have had
one or more such incidents reported in the past three years. The Insti-
tute also estimates that up to 80 percent of students who are victims
of a racial incident do not report it so that the actual number of inci-
dents is probably far larger than the reported number.'
As these examples suggest, hate speech is not limited to a face-to-
face confrontation or shouts from a crowd. Hate speech takes many
forms. It may appear on tee shirts, on posters, on classroom black-
boards, on student bulletin boards, in flyers and leaflets, in phone
calls, in letters, or in electronic mail messages on a computer screen.
Hate speech may be a cartoon appearing in a student publication, a
joke told on a campus radio show, an anonymous note slipped under a
dormitory or meeting room door, or graffiti scribbled on walls or side-
walks. Hate speech may be conveyed through destruction or deface-
ment of posters or displays; through symbols such as burning crosses,
swastikas, Ku Klux Klan insignia, and Confederate flags; and even
through themes for social functions, such as blackface Harlem parties,
jungle parties, or white history week parties.
THE HARMS OF HATE SPEECH
Why is hate speech such a wrenching problem, deserving of our
sustained and sensitive attention? There are many reasons, some
more obvious than others. Of special concern are the harms that hate
speech causes to the victim, the victimized group, the campus commu-
nity, and ultimately to society.4 It may be difficult for us to fully ap-
preciate these harms, for as Professor Charles Lawrence has reminded
us:
Not everyone has known the experience of being victimized by
racist, misogynist, or homophobic speech, and we do not share
equally the burden of the societal harm it inflicts. Often we are
too quick to say we have heard the victims' cries when we have
not; we are too eager to assure ourselves we have experienced the
same injury .. . [when we have not]."
3. See, e.g., Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amend-
ment, 32 WM & MARY L. REV. 267, 268 (1991); Darryl Brown, Note, Racism And Race
Relations In The University, 76 VA. L. REV. 295, 315-17 (1990); Peter Bryne, Racial
Insults And Free Speech Within The University, 79 GEo. L.J. 399, 401-02 (1991);
compare Judith Hanna, Racial Tension On University Campuses, 3 SYNTHEsis: LAW
AND POLICY IN HIGHER EDUCATION, No. 2, 166-67 (1991).
4. See, e.g., Post, supra note 3, at 271-77; Charles Lawrence, If He Hollers Let
Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 458-66 (1990);
Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story,
87 MICH. L. REv. 2320, 2335-41 (1989); Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort
Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HAv. CR.-C.L. L. REv. 133,
135-49 (1982).
5. Lawrence, supra note 4, at 459.
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On one level, when hate speech is directed at particular individu-
als, it causes real hurt to those individuals. The victim may suffer hu-
miliation, shock, outrage, fear, and anxiety. These may be psychic
rather than physical injuries, and the result may be emotional rather
than physical scarring, but the wounds are every bit as real.
On another level, hate speech inflicts pain on the broader class of
persons who belong to the group which the hate speech denigrates. If
blacks are targeted by a particular hate speech incident, for instance,
all blacks on campus who become aware of the incident may be
hurt-not just the person who was subjected to the speech or those
who personally witnessed it. A case in point is the introductory exam-
ple about the defacement of the Beethoven poster after an argument
over whether the composer had black ancestors. Blacks throughout
the university, students as well as faculty members, reacted to that
incident. One black faculty member described her pain as follows:
[The most deeply offending aspect of the Beethoven defacement
concerns] the ability of black and brown and red and yellow peo-
ple to name their rightful contributions to the universe of music
or any other field. It is the right to claim that we are, after all,
part of Western Civilization. It is the right to claim our existence
.... The failure of [the university] to acknowledge this level of
the harm in the [Beethoven] incident allows students to deface
me. In the margins of their notebooks, or unconsciously perhaps,
they deface me; to them, I "look like a stereotype of a black [per-
son]," . . . not an academic; they see my brown face and they
draw lines "emphasizing . .. the lips, and coloring in the black
frizzy hair ... " In the margins of their notebooks, I am
obliterated.'
On yet another level, hate speech causes harm to the entire cam-
pus community, with the heaviest burdens still being borne by the
victimized groups. The feelings of vulnerability, insecurity, and aliena-
tion that repeated incidents of hate speech engender in the victimized
groups may undermine the conditions necessary to constructive dia-
logue on campus. Members of the victimized groups, moreover, may
be unable to take full advantage of the educational opportunities
available at the university. A sense of community, both for the resi-
dential community and for the community of learners, may be lost to
the campus.
All these effects of hate speech share a common theme. They all
implicate deeply held values of equality and individual dignity. The
threat to these values, standing alone, is more than enough to arouse
6. Martha Minow, On Neutrality, Equality & Tolerance: New Norms for a Dec-
ade Of Distinction, CHANGz, Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 19-20, quoting Patricia Williams, The
Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay On Formal Equal Opportunity, 87 MICH. L. Rzv.
2128, 2135-37 (1989).
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our concern about hate speech. Whenever such concern moves us to
consider regulating hate speech in order to protect equality values,
however, free speech values become implicated as well. It is because
both sets of values are at stake that we must approach the hate
speech problem, and legal analysis of the issues, with exceeding sensi-
tivity and care.
APPLICABLE FREE SPEECH PRINCIPLES
By most counts, about 200 colleges and universities in the United
States have amended their campus conduct codes or adopted new
codes in order to set standards of permissible speech. A wide variety
of standards and provisions have been suggested or implemented for
this purpose. Since hate speech employs words and symbols to convey
a message, and since campus code provisions may prohibit and punish
particular types of messages, constitutional issues arise under the free
speech and free press clauses of the First Amendment. Formally, only
public colleges and universities are bound by the First Amendment's
provisions. Private institutions, not being engaged in state action, are
not so constrained. In practice, however, private institutions may vol-
untarily commit themselves to comply with First Amendment norms;
and, in the context of hate speech, many private institutions have un-
dertaken to do so.
Four major free speech principles serve to constrain the authority
of universities to regulate hate speech. Under the first principle, regu-
lations of the content of speech (that is, regulations of the speaker's
message) are highly suspect. As the U.S. Supreme Court has fre-
quently stated, "[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that
government has no power to restrict expression because of its mes-
sage, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content . . . .There is an
'equality of status in the field of ideas', and government must afford
all points of view an equal opportunity to be heard."' 7
Under the second free speech principle, the emotional content as
well as the cognitive content of speech is protected from government
regulation. In Cohen v. California, the U.S. Supreme Court explained
that:
[m]uch linguistic expression serves a dual communicative func-
tion: it conveys not only ideas capable of relatively precise, de-
tached explication, but otherwise inexpressible emotions as well.
In fact, words are often chosen as much for their emotive as their
cognitive force. We cannot sanction the view that the Constitu-
tion, while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual speech,
has little or no regard for that emotive function which, practically
7. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972) (quoting ALEXANDER
MEIKLEJOHN, POLiIcAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 27
(1948)).
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speaking, may often be the more important element of the overall
message .... I
Under the third free speech principle, speech may not be prohib-
ited merely because persons who hear or view it are offended by the
message. In 1990 the Supreme Court reaffirmed that "[if there is a
bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the gov-
ernment may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."9
Under the fourth free speech principle, government may not sub-
ject speech activity to regulations whose language is either overbroad
or vague and would thereby create a chilling effect on the exercise of
free speech rights. As the Supreme Court has stated, "Because First
Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government
may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity.' 0
Each of these four free speech principles fully applies to universi-
ties. As the Supreme Court emphasized in Healy v. James:
[T]he precedents of this Court leave no room for the view that
... First Amendment protections should apply with less force on
college campuses than in the community at large. Quite to the
contrary, "[t]he vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is
nowhere more vital than in the community of American
schools.""
At the same time, however, the U.S. Supreme Court has made
clear that academic communities are "special environments," and that
"First Amendment rights must be analyzed 'in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment.' "1 The university's inter-
ests, the values that the university may promote, and the nature of
threats to these interests and values may therefore differ from that
which exists in other contexts. Thus, although First Amendment prin-
ciples apply with full force, different considerations may enter into
their application to the campus.
8. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
9. United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404, 2410 (1990) (quoting Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)); see also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971);
Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978).
10. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963); see also Smith v. Goguen, 415
U.S. 566 (1974) (vagueness); Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987) (overbreadth).
11. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479, 487 (1960)); see also Papish v. Board of Curators of Univ. of Missouri, 410 U.S.
667 (1973).
12. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 268 n.5 (1981) (quoting Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)); Healy v. James, 408
U.S. at 180.
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THE DECISIONMAKING PROCESS: FIVE CRITERIA
To take full account of these four free speech principles, in con-
junction with the many other complexities of the hate speech prob-
lem, universities should have a structured process for decisionmaking
on these matters. The design of the process is just as critical to the
success of a university's endeavors as is its substantive analysis of the
First Amendment issues. Clearly, not any process will do. I have de-
vised five criteria that a university process must meet if it is to facili-
tate effective management of the hate speech problem.
Criterion Number One: The process must foster a comprehensive
approach to, and comprehensive perspective on, the hate speech
problem on American campuses. To meet this criterion, the process
must encompass both the equality and the free speech aspects of the
problem. Similarly, it must encompass both the legal and the policy
aspects of the problem. The process must also expose the relevant so-
ciological, psychological, and philosophical aspects of the hate speech
problem, enabling this expertise to illuminate the underlying causes of
hate behavior and its effects upon individuals, groups, and institu-
tions. In addition, the process must facilitate collection of information
on the extent and manifestations of the hate speech problem on
American campuses.
Criterion Number Two: The process must both encourage and
rely upon dialogue within the campus community. The full range of
campus interests and perspectives should be reflected in this dialogue.
Thus the various constituencies represented in the student body
should be included, as well as faculty and administrative staff. Such
dialogue should be both the starting point and the end product of the
process.
At its start, the process should begin to flush out and seek mutual
respect for the differing points of view regarding the hate speech
problem. As Professor Martha Minow has stated:
We can't really learn about the partiality of our own perspec-
tives without talking with other people about their perspectives,
which help us rethink our own. ...
[D]o we have confidence that we know the meanings of [hate
behavior] incidents from the perspectives of people we do not
know well . . ?
In short, can we learn to look at perspectives other than our
own, and then still others, continually unsettling our assumptions
that we know what others think?13
At its end, the process should have begun to foster conditions of
13. Minow, supra note 6, at 20.
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tolerance that allow the dialogue to continue productively into the fu-
ture. Tolerance, according to Professor Minow:
means doing more than inviting outsiders to be included-it
means listening to their views about what it would take for them
to feel included. In colleges and universities, this means dia-
logue-dialogue about equality, neutrality and tolerance, about
discipline and freedom, about injury and harassment. It means
considering the preconditions for participation-the precondi-
tions for assuring that every member of the community feels like
a member of the community.1 4
Criterion Number Three: The process must encompass and facil-
itate consideration of non-regulatory as well as regulatory options
for managing the hate speech problem, giving priority to the non-
regulatory options. Non-regulatory options could include at least the
following: (1) education options, such as curriculum revisions, orienta-
tion programs, or extra-curricular activities focusing on matters such
as race relations, gender relations, and multi-culturalism; (2) training
options, such as sensitivity training for student leaders or for staff
members such as residence hall advisors and campus security officers;
(3) counter-speech options, such as the strategic use of statements by
university officials and student leaders that repudiate and condemn
hate speech incidents occurring on campus; (4) communication op-
tions, such as a formalized process for reporting hate behavior inci-
dents; and (5) conflict-resolution options, such as a complaint process
with voluntary mediation and counseling for persons involved in al-
leged hate behavior incidents. In contrast, regulatory options would
include all proposals relying on the prohibition of certain types of
speech and imposition of involuntary sanctions on transgressors.
As between regulatory and non-regulatory initiatives, the non-
regulatory initiatives may have a broader and longer range impact on
hate speech. Regulatory initiatives, if not combined with substantial
non-regulatory initiatives, may be ineffective or counter-productive.
Regulatory initiatives, moreover, necessarily raise substantial First
Amendment issues and risk erosion of free speech values. For these
reasons, the decision making process should focus first on non-regula-
tory options, moving to regulatory options only if the university deter-
mines that non-regulatory initiatives alone will not suitably alleviate
the hate speech problem.
Criterion Number Four: The process must assure that university
initiatives for combatting hate speech are adapted to the particular
circumstances of that particular campus. There is no all-purpose so-
lution for hate speech that can fit all campuses. Campuses differ from
one another in many relevant respects. There are differences in the
climate of tolerance that prevails, the diversity of the student body,
14. Id. at 25.
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the perceptions and attitudes commonly shared by students, the pat-
terns of social interaction, and the institutional structure and mission.
Campuses also differ in terms of their actual experiences with the hate
speech problem. The number of reported incidents varies substan-
tially from campus to campus, as do the types of incidents, their effect
on the campus environment, and the pattern of institutional re-
sponses. The process should assure that these differences and vari-
ables are taken into account, so that the problems are addressed in
terms most meaningful to that campus and the solutions are crafted
to its particular reality and experience.
Criterion Number Five: The process must focus on First Amend-
ment issues in an exceedingly methodical and concrete way calcu-
lated to shed maximum light on legal obstacles to regulation as well
as available latitude for regulatory initiatives. It would be a mistake
to approach the complex First Amendment issues of hate speech in
the abstract. As the legal philosopher, John Chipman Gray, warned
over 60 years ago:
The danger in dealing with abstract conceptions, whether in the
Law or in any other department of human knowledge, is that of
losing foothold on the actual earth. The best guard against this is
the concrete instance, the example .... I shall, therefore, try to
test the soundness of any theories I may advance, by applying
them to sets of facts and seeing how they work in practice.1"
To achieve such concreteness, the process must provide for the
identification of particular types of hate speech the university desires
to regulate and the determination of whether some particular First
Amendment theory would support regulation of each such type of
hate speech. This process of matching the concrete example to the
specific theory must be methodical because different types of regula-
tions will require different types of analysis under the First Amend-
ment. There is no omnibus regulatory approach that can serve all of a
university's regulatory interests regarding hate speech. Nor is there
any grand First Amendment theory that can justify regulation of all
the types of hate speech an institution might wish to reach. In each
instance, therefore, the question will be whether some particular type
of regulation, covering some particular type of hate speech, can be
drafted and enforced without substantially intruding upon free speech
values and risking a later court ruling that the regulation is
unconstitutional.
OPTIONS FOR REGULATING HATE SPEECH
Suppose that a university, employing a process that meets these
15. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 4-5 (2d ed.
1927).
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five criteria,16 determines to regulate hate speech to the full extent
permitted by the First Amendment. Suppose further that this univer-
sity has developed an extensive list of specific hate behaviors that it
wishes to regulate, and is exploring regulatory options for covering
each example on its list. What are the types of regulatory options that
this university may employ in this phase of the process? I will first
discuss options that should not be employed because of legal or strate-
gic obstacles to their use, and then move on to options that may be
employed if the university proceeds with great care.
First, the university may not simply ban particular words from
the campus on the assumption that such words are used as epithets or
slurs. To select words from the introductory examples, the university
may not simply ban use of the words "nigger", "fag", "Chink", or
"slut". The meaning and effect of a word depends upon the context in
which it is used. Thus a particular word may or may not be used to
denigrate.17 The tone of voice, accompanying body language, relation-
ship between the parties, and setting in which the word is used all
influence the understanding of the communication. The use of a word
in a class discussion or dorm bull session, for example, may differ
vastly from the use of the same word in a face-to-face confrontation or
an anonymous note. In addition to these evaluative difficulties, ban-
ning particular words from campus would raise clear constitutional
problems under the four free speech principles. As the U.S. Supreme
Court emphasized in Cohen v. California,
[I]t is . . . often true that one man's vulgarity is another's lyric.
Indeed, we think it is largely because governmental officials can-
not make principled distinctions in this area that the Constitu-
tion leaves matters of taste and style so largely to the individual.
... [W]e cannot indulge the facile assumption that one can forbid
particular words without also running a substantial risk of sup-
pressing ideas in the process.18
Second, for similar reasons, the university may not simply ban
word usages that are generically defined and deemed to be hurtful.
For example, the university may not simply ban "racial epithets,"
"ethnic slurs," or "sexist insults;" nor may it simply ban "vilification,"
"invective," or "bigotry." Even if context is taken into account in ap-
plying such generic and unadorned terms, the terms themselves are
not self-defining. There is no uniform understanding of what language
usages they would cover. There is no confining principle that would
strictly limit their application. Therefore, a regulation employing such
terms to describe prohibited speech would surely violate the fourth
16. For a specific example of a nine-phase process that would meet these five cri-
teria, see William Kaplin, A Proposed Process for Managing the First Amendment
Aspects of Hate Speech on Campus, 63 J. OF HIGHER EDUC. (1992) (forthcoming).
17. Greenawalt, supra note 2, at 291.
18. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 at 25-26.
1992
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW
free speech principle, providing that regulations must be sufficiently
narrow and clear to avoid the twin evils of overbreadth and vagueness.
Third, the university may not simply ban words that are intended
to humiliate or hurt. It is unlikely that principled distinctions could
be made between the types and levels of humiliation and hurt that
would be prohibited and those that would not. As Professor Greena-
walt has noted, "Much harsh language is a natural part of heated per-
sonal exchanges and strong disagreements about ideas. Since few of us
are able and inclined to modulate our discourse to the magnitude of a
subject, the law must tolerate many words that hurt." 9 Similarly, it is
unlikely that the university could distinguish words intended to hu-
miliate and hurt from those that merely offend a person's sensibilities.
The latter type of words are clearly protected under the third free
speech principle, which prohibits government from regulating speech
merely because of its offensiveness. Even if such distinctions concern-
ing humiliation and hurt could be made, other obstacles arise in at-
tempting to ascertain the intent of the person who spoke the hurtful
words.20 A speaker may have "mixed motives," intending in part to
hurt and in part to convey information-including information about
the speaker's emotional state. Or the speaker's intent may simply be
impenetrable, so that university decision makers cannot ascertain the
intent after the fact. For all these reasons, a regulation prohibiting
speech intended to humiliate or hurt would be beyond the university's
capacity to administer, and would also violate the First Amendment.
Fourth, the university may not combat hate speech simply by
banning false assertions regarding particular persons or their racial,
ethnic, religious, or gender groups. At first blush, such a regulation
would appear to present fewer problems under the four free speech
principles. The requirement that the speech be false would appear to
confine a university's discretion, and the law presumably would not
protect speech content which is false. But a test of falsity may be so
limited in its application, or so difficult to administer, that it cannot
provide the basis for meaningful regulation of hate- speech. Only
speech asserting or implying facts that are subject to verification can
be tested for falsity. Often speech does not have such a factual base.
Instead, it merely asserts an opinion or expresses an emotion. Addi-
tionally, speech that does purport to assert facts may be so vague, or
the underlying factual data may be so uncertain, that the statement
cannot be judged to be either true or false. Consider the introductory
example of the student on the dormitory quadrangle who yelled:
"What are you, a fag?" "What are you, a Jew?" It is not likely that
these statements are fact-based or, if they are, could be subjected to
any kind of verification. It is also unlikely that any particular meaning
19. Greenawalt, supra note 2, at 298.
20. See Toni M. Massaro, Equality And Freedom of Expression: The Hate
Speech Dilemma, 32 WM. & MARY L. Rzv. 211, 245-46 (1990); Greenawalt, supra note
2, at 298; Post, supra note 3, at 324 nn. 253-55 and accompanying text.
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intended by the speaker or conveyed by these labels could be
identified.
If the university cannot regulate hate speech in any of these four
ways, then how may it regulate? As previously indicated, no single
regulatory approach exists that is consistent with the four free speech
principles and can cover the myriad of situations a university may
wish to confront. The university should therefore pursue a combina-
tion of regulatory approaches, each one geared to a particular segment
of the hate behaviors it wishes to confront. Under such an incremental
approach, some types of hate speech will simply remain unregulated
because they cannot constitutionally be addressed.
I shall give six examples of hate behavior "segments" that a uni-
versity could probably regulate consistent with the First Amend-
ment.2 1 Any regulation covering such segments, of course, must in-
clude definitions and qualifying language to narrow and focus its
scope.2"
First, and easiest, the university may regulate hate behavior that
does not use words or symbols to convey a message, and therefore
does not involve protected speech. The introductory examples include
actions such as throwing eggs, public urination, and spreading human
excrement. Such actions clearly are not protected by the First Amend-
ment. Other obvious examples include kicking, shoving, beatings, spit-
ting, stone throwing, trashing of rooms, and blocking of pathways and
entryways. All such activities can be reached under carefully drafted
regulations concerning physical attacks, destruction or defacement of
property, and other prohibited acts such as indecent exposure.
Second, when hate speech is combined with non-speech actions in
the same course of behavior, the university may regulate the non-
speech aspects of the behavior without violating the First Amend-
ment. In the introductory examples, a Jewish student union was
spray-painted with swastikas and slogans, graffiti were painted on
sidewalks, and a hate insignia was carved into a dorm room door. All
these behaviors conveyed messages and therefore involved speech. But
21. In addition to these six examples of regulable "segments," the university could
also regulate hate speech which is obscene or defamatory, or constitutes incitement or
fighting words according to current U.S. Supreme Court definitions. See Matter of
Welfare of R.A.V, 464 N.W. 2d 507 (Minn. 1991), cert. granted, 111 S.Ct. 2795 (1991)
(cross burning as fighting words or incitement); see generally DAVID TATm., MARTIN
MICHAELSON, AND DANIEL KOHRMAN, How THE FIRST AMENDMENT APPLIES To OFFEN-
SIVE EXPRESSION ON THE CAMPUSES OF PUBLIC COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES (1990). The
university could also regulate the time, place, or manner, as opposed to the content, of
hate speech. See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-violence, 468 U.S. 288(1984). Such regulations would fall into established exceptions to, or be outside the
scope of, the first three of the four free speech principles in the text above. Any such
regulation, however, would have to be sufficiently narrow and specific to avoid viola-
tion of the fourth free speech principle.
22. See Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989); see
generally cases cited supra note 10.
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each behavior also had a non-speech aspect - destruction of prop-
erty. While the university cannot prohibit particular messages, it can
prohibit destructive acts. Such acts may therefore be covered under
neutral regulations governing such non-speech matters as destruction
and defacement of property.
Third, the university could probably regulate hate speech that is
intimidating, threatening, or harassing, if such speech is addressed to
particular individuals and fosters in them a realistic fear for their
physical safety or the security of their property.2 Threats that create
realistic fears for the safety of a person's family, living group, or
friends might also be regulated. Speech activities with such effects are
analogous to assaults which typically are punishable under both crimi-
nal and tort law. The introductory examples involving the white stu-
dents in KKK garb who crashed into the black student's room, the
male students who followed the female student across campus at night
making sexual threats, and the taunters who accosted the group of
Japanese students could fall into this category. Such activities, even
though carried out in part through speech, can be narrowly regulated
because the danger of bodily harm or property damage, along with the
psychic injury to the person threatened, overrides whatever speech in-
terest may be at stake.
Fourth, the university could probably regulate hate speech that
occurs in private areas of the campus and thereby infringes upon pri-
vacy interests of listeners legitimately in these areas. The place most
likely to qualify as private for purposes of such a regulation is the
college dormitory, especially the rooms or suites in which students
live. The introductory examples involving the defaced Beethoven
poster in the black theme dorm and the condoms and "Jewish slut"
sign on the dorm room door may fall within the rationale. The scrib-
bling of graffiti in the Chinese student's library carrel might also be
included. For First Amendment purposes, such private areas are not
considered to be "public forums" open to public dialogue. Further-
more, the persons occupying such private places may be considered
"captive audiences" that cannot guard their privacy by avoiding the
hate speech. 24 For these two reasons, the likelihood is increased that
hate speech regulations limited to such private places would be
constitutional.
Fifth, the university could probably regulate hate speech that
serves to implement or reinforce a policy of racial or other discrimina-
tion. If a campus fraternity places a sign in front of its house reading
23. Compare Georgia v. Miller, 398 S.E.2d 547 (1990). Statutes and regulations
that punish intimidation, threats, or harassment often include an intent requirement.
To make out a violation, it must be shown that the speaker had intended to intimi-
date, threaten, or harass his victim. Such intent requirements may pose additional
complexities (see supra note 20 and accompanying text), especially when administered
by students or staff at a university (see Kaplin, supra note 16).
24. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
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"No blacks allowed here," for example, such speech may be an act of
discrimination, making it unlikely that black students would seek to
become members of that fraternity. When speech is an integral ele-
ment of a pattern of discriminatory conduct, universities should be
able to cover such speech under a regulation prohibiting discrimina-
tion on the basis of identifiable group characteristics such as race, sex,
or ethnicity. In effect, the goal of eradicating such discrimination on
campus becomes a compelling interest that justifies the limited intru-
sion into the discriminator's speech interests.
Sixth, a university might be able to regulate certain types of hate
speech that are part of a pattern whose effects on the targeted group
are so pervasive that group members are unable to benefit fully from
campus educational opportunities. Under this rationale, pervasive
patterns of hate speech, left unchecked, may create a denial of equal
educational opportunity. This denial provides the university with a
compelling interest in intervening to re-establish conditions of equal-
ity. In Healy v. James, the U.S. Supreme Court declared that univer-
sities need not tolerate First Amendment activities that "substantially
interfere with the opportunity of other students to obtain an educa-
tion."25 In other cases, the Court has held that government has a com-
pelling interest in combatting denials of educational opportunity
caused by race discrimination, and that compelling interests may
overcome First Amendment rights.2 6 To invoke the reasoning of such
cases, the university apparently must demonstrate that a continuing
pattern of hate speech exists on campus, that the "hate speech"
targets an identifiable racial or other minority student group, and that
this student group therefore cannot pursue its educational opportuni-
ties on equal terms with other students. Such circumstances would be
similar to the "hostile environment" concept that has become promi-
nent in the field of employment discrimination.17 In effect, the univer-
sity must demonstrate that continuing acts of hate speech have cre-
ated a "hostile environment" on campus that serves to discriminate
against an identifiable student group in its pursuit of an equal educa-
tion. If such conditions existed, the university might temporarily im-
plement narrow regulations that protect equal educational opportu-
nity by prohibiting hate speech which perpetuates these conditions.
Such regulations could provide sanctions against student organiza-
25. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. at 189; see Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. at 277.
26. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); Widmar v. Vincent,
454 U.S. 263 (1981).
27. See, e.g., Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla.
1991). Caution is appropriate in relying on the "hostile environment" employment dis-
crimination cases to govern student hate speech problems. The authority relationships
between employer and employee may differ from those between institution and stu-
dent. The close, sustained working relationships that may prevail in the employment
context may not always parallel the situation of students in academia. Moreover, First
Amendment law concerning the free speech rights of employees does not always paral-
lel First Amendment law concerning free speech rights of students. See, e.g., Connick
v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
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tions as well as against individual students.2
CONFRONTING THE CHALLENGES
Clearly, the hate speech problem presents a formidable challenge
to universities, to the members of academic communities, and to soci-
ety as a whole. To confront this challenge, many important choices
must be made. But no choice need be made between the values of
equality and the values of free speech. Equality and free speech are at
the crossroads, but they need not part ways, and we need not leave
either behind or weight either down with excess baggage. The choice,
rather, is between various combinations of actions that a university
might pursue in the name of both equality and free speech. The selec-
tion of appropriate combinations of non-regulatory and regulatory ini-
tiatives will require exceedingly careful attention to process concerns,
as well as to free speech principles.
Beyond these challenges of law and process, there is yet a greater
challenge for us all. The problem of hate speech provides a mirror in
which we can see ourselves better. Through our reactions to this prob-
lem, we can more clearly see who we are and what we stand for as
individuals and collectively as academic communities. We can learn
much on a personal level about racism, sexism, anti-Semitism, and
homophobia in our society. We can confront our own values; test our
own attitudes; review our own behaviors; and gauge our own capacities
for tolerance. Can we really understand the depth and significance of
the hate speech problem, not from our own egocentric and condi-
tioned perspectives but from the perspectives of those who are poten-
tial victims? Can we develop the empathy and awareness that will al-
low us to respond to this problem with sensitivity to persons who may
have a skin color different from ours, or may come from a different
culture, or may have a sexual orientation that is not ours? Can we
28. At the time of this lecture, the courts had decided only one campus hate
speech case involving students: Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D.
Mich. 1989). Since then opinions have been issued in two other such cases: Iota Xi
Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason University, 1991 WL 195325 (E.D.
Va. 1991); and UWM Post, Inc., v. Board of Regents of University of Wisconsin Sys-
tem, 1991 WL 206819 (E.D. Wis. 1991). Both courts rely on First Amendment free
speech principles to invalidate actions a university had taken to regulate hate speech.
The Iota Xi opinion relies particularly on the first and third free speech principles; see
supra text accompanying notes 7 and 9. The UWM Post opinion relies on all four of
the free speech principles discussed above, with particular emphasis on the fourth
principle concerning overbreadth and vagueness; see supra text accompanying note 10.
Neither opinion casts doubt on the first five regulatory approaches or segments devel-
oped in this article since the regulatory activities at issue were outside the bounds of
these five suggested approaches. The UWM Post case, however, does consider (and
invalidate) a more expansive version of regulatory approach number six; see supra text
accompanying notes 25-27; it is possible that some of the broader reasoning from this
case could cast doubt even on a narrow version of this approach. At the least, this case
does make clear that great caution must be utilized even with narrow regulations of
the type suggested in regulatory approach number six. See supra note 27 for brief
discussion of the need for caution.
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develop personal commitments to both equality and to freedom of ex-
pression? Above all, it is these challenges that I leave you with today.
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